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Across various contexts, parties and courts have pressed for territorial rules 
in cases implicating technology and national security. This Essay suggests that 
presumptively territorial approaches to these questions are misguided. Territorial 
rules do not track the division of authority or capacity among the branches, nor are 
they effective proxies for the important interests of regulators or regulatees. On is-
sues of technology and national security, territorial rules seem particularly ill suit-
ed: territorial rules aspire to certainty, but technology makes it harder to define 
“territoriality” in a consistent and predictable way; technology weakens territoriali-
ty as a proxy for policy goals because data often move in ways disconnected with 
the interests of users and lawmakers; and technology makes it easier for public or 
private actors to circumvent territorial rules (often without detection), thus interfer-
ing with the existing allocation of policymaking authority. This Essay explores the-
se themes with respect to the Stored Communications Act, electronic surveillance 
law, and court-access doctrines in criminal and civil litigation. The conclusion is 
that territorial approaches in such cases may have been wrong when first adopted 
or may have succumbed to desuetude in the intervening years. 
INTRODUCTION 
Among the most prominent legal issues arising from the 
global war on terror have been questions regarding the extra-
territorial reach of the US Constitution. How (if at all) does 
the Fourth Amendment apply to global surveillance?1 What 
rights are afforded to detainees held outside the United 
States?2 What is the appropriate division of authority among 
the branches of government with respect to overseas military 
 
 †  Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. I am grateful to Daniel Abebe, 
Anthony Colangelo, John Coyle, Paul Crane, Aziz Huq, Samuel Issacharoff, David 
Moore, and the participants in the University of Chicago Law Review Symposium for 
their thoughtful comments. 
 1 See generally, for example, Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and the Global 
Internet, 67 Stan L Rev 285 (2015). 
 2 See, for example, Boumediene v Bush, 553 US 723, 732 (2008) (asking “whether 
[aliens detained at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba,] have the constitutional privilege of habeas 
corpus”). 
  
46  The University of Chicago Law Review [83:45 
   
operations?3 Although these constitutional questions have gar-
nered headlines, questions about the extraterritorial scope of US 
law also have important subconstitutional dimensions: When 
and how should statutes, executive orders, and judicial doctrines 
apply extraterritorially? 
This Essay suggests that presumptively territorial ap-
proaches to these questions are misguided. Territorial rules do 
not track the division of authority or capacity among the 
branches, nor are they effective proxies for the important inter-
ests of regulators or regulatees. On issues of technology and na-
tional security, territorial rules seem particularly ill suited: 
•   Territorial rules aspire to certainty, but technology 
makes it harder to define “territoriality” in a con-
sistent and predictable way. 
•   Technology weakens territoriality as a proxy for policy 
goals because data often move in ways that are dis-
connected with the interests of users and lawmakers. 
•   Technology makes it easier for public and private ac-
tors to circumvent territorial rules (often without de-
tection), thus interfering with the existing allocation 
of policymaking authority. 
Therefore, when regulating national security and technology, al-
ternatives to territorial rules are likely appropriate. 
This Essay proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses territori-
ality in general, explaining that territorial rules are too easily 
treated as presumptive. The balance of the Essay applies the 
lessons of Part I to three issues related to technology and na-
tional security: the Stored Communications Act4 (SCA), elec-
tronic surveillance law, and court-access doctrine. Nothing here 
is meant to suggest that modern technology is unique or that 
national-security cases are exceptional. Instead, I argue that 
these technology/national-security challenges give us an oppor-
tunity to reevaluate territorial doctrines that may have been 
wrong when first adopted or that may have succumbed to desue-
tude in the intervening years. 
 
 3 See, for example, Libya and War Powers: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign 
Relations, 112th Cong, 1st Sess 7, 12–14 (2011) (statement of Harold Koh, Legal Adviser, 
US Department of State) (discussing the Constitution and the War Powers Resolution). 
 4 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 § 201 (“Stored Communications 
Act”), Pub L No 99-508, 100 Stat 1848, 1860–68, codified as amended at 18 USC § 2701 
et seq. 
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I.  TERRITORIALITY 
Across many areas of law, courts apply territorial rules to 
decide questions of substance and procedure.5 Although particu-
lar circumstances may justify territorial rules6 and particular 
texts may expressly call for them,7 a presumption as to territori-
al scope is unjustified on either formalist or functionalist 
grounds, and technology/national-security cases exacerbate the-
se concerns. 
Formalist arguments for territorial rules depend on legal 
distinctions among the branches that track territoriality. The 
Constitution, though, does not draw such distinctions in text or 
even in gloss—there may be different rules for foreign affairs,8 
but that is different from saying that there are different rules 
for foreign territory. Technology makes extraterritoriality an 
even worse proxy for foreign affairs, as it has become easier to af-
fect foreign relations without physically crossing an international 
border. Subconstitutionally, courts have suggested that territory 
should serve as a presumptive measure for legislative intent be-
cause “Congress is primarily concerned with domestic condi-
tions.”9 But as many scholars have recognized,10 this assumption 
is not necessarily warranted: Congress is often concerned with 
 
 5 See, for example, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v Arabian Ameri-
can Oil Co, 499 US 244, 248 (1991) (noting that “Congress legislates against the back-
drop of the presumption against extraterritoriality”); United States v Verdugo-Urquidez, 
494 US 259, 266–67 (1990) (“[I]t was never suggested that the [Fourth Amendment] was 
intended to restrain the actions of the Federal Government against aliens outside of the 
United States territory.”); Sun Oil Co v Wortman, 486 US 717, 722 (1988) (“This Court 
has long and repeatedly held that the Constitution does not bar application of the forum 
State’s statute of limitations to claims that in their substance are and must be governed 
by the law of a different State.”). 
 6 Rules about real property, for example, seem like good candidates for this dis-
tinction, though even in that context one can imagine spillover effects that may justify 
extraterritorial property law. See, for example, Jack L. Goldsmith and Alan O. Sykes, 
The Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 110 Yale L J 785, 795 (2001) (noting 
that nuisance law may apply extraterritorially). 
 7 For example, prior to the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Ap-
propriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (“USA 
PATRIOT Act”), Pub L No 107-56, 115 Stat 272, the prohibition on providing material 
support for terrorist activities was expressly territorial. 18 USC § 2339A (2000). 
 8 See, for example, American Insurance Association v Garamendi, 539 US 396, 
414–15 (2003) (explaining that the historical gloss on executive power gives the presi-
dent “a degree of independent authority to act” in foreign affairs). 
 9 Foley Bros, Inc v Filardo, 336 US 281, 285 (1949). See also Morrison v National 
Australia Bank Ltd, 561 US 247, 255 (2010). 
 10 See, for example, Zachary D. Clopton, Replacing the Presumption against Extra-
territoriality, 94 BU L Rev 1, 13–15 (2014). 
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external conditions and their consequences.11 When regulating 
national security and technology, this territorialist assumption 
is an even worse fit with reality. And because technology may 
lower the costs of international movement12 (for example, the 
movement of data), regulated entities may more easily evade 
territorial laws while effecting territorial consequences. 
Functionalist explanations exist for territorial rules as well, 
but they too are unpersuasive. Some courts and commentators 
have argued that territorial rules respect foreign sovereignty,13 
but for the same reasons that Congress’s concerns are not territo-
rially bounded, foreign states’ interests will not always track ter-
ritorial lines.14 Others have suggested that due process justifies 
territoriality because extraterritorial parties will lack notice that 
a statute applies to them.15 Yet notice may track nonterritorial 
connections as well: were an individual to use technology to 
threaten US national security from abroad, the application of 
US law to that conduct would not be wholly unexpected.16 
Another functionalist justification for a territorial presump-
tion, or indeed any presumption, is the desire for certainty. 
Whether a rule is designed to estimate legislative preferences or 
to elicit them,17 the purpose of picking a clear rule is to 
“preserv[e] a stable background against which Congress can legis-
late.”18 Clear rules also aim to create stability and predictability 
 
 11 Indeed, as Professor Lea Brilmayer put it: “[I]n the vast majority of cases, legis-
latures have no actual intent on territorial reach.” Lea Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and 
the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 Mich L Rev 392, 393 (1980) (emphasis omitted). 
 12 See, for example, David Hummels, Transportation Costs and International Trade 
in the Second Era of Globalization, 21 J Econ Persp 131, 151–52 (Summer 2007) (noting 
that technology has lowered the cost of air shipping). 
 13 See, for example, Arabian American Oil, 499 US at 248 (avoiding unintended 
clashes with foreign nations); McCulloch v Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 
372 US 10, 20–22 (1963) (avoiding conflict with the laws of Honduras). See also Clopton, 
94 BU L Rev at 8 (cited in note 10) (discussing the historical and functional roots of the 
presumption against extraterritoriality). 
 14 For example, the bases of jurisdiction in international law, which are broader 
than mere territory, offer some suggestion of the scope of national interests. See Re-
statement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States §§ 401–33 (1987). 
 15 See, for example, Anthony J. Colangelo, A Unified Approach to Extraterritoriality, 
97 Va L Rev 1019, 1026–27 (2011). 
 16 See Clopton, 94 BU L Rev at 18–19 (cited in note 10). 
 17 See, for example, Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 
102 Colum L Rev 2162, 2165–66 (2002) (arguing that when preferences are unclear, de-
fault rules that provoke or elicit legislative responses are often better than judicial at-
tempts to estimate the legislature’s preferences). 
 18 Morrison, 561 US at 261–63 (arguing in favor of employing a presumption 
against extraterritoriality). 
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for regulated parties as well as enforcers.19 But it turns out that 
territorial rules have not lived up to their promise of reducing 
decision costs. Even in low-tech circumstances, the meaning of 
“territoriality” has vexed commentators and courts.20 Modern 
technology deepens the challenge of defining what counts as 
“territorial.” Regarding data, for example, does territoriality re-
fer to the location of the source, the recipient, the storage, or the 
government access? Certainty may be important and clear rules 
may be desirable, but territoriality does not achieve these ends. 
Technology also creates uncertainty even if the lawmaker 
declares a clear definition of “territoriality.” For one, data may 
be duplicated or partitioned for the purposes of transfer and 
storage without the knowledge of any relevant user.21 So even 
though the physical locations of data may be certain, those loca-
tions may be completely disconnected from any relevant interest 
of the technology’s users or regulators. Technology may also al-
low regulated entities to cheaply evade territorial rules. Con-
gress may be certain in its purpose of prohibiting domestic 
eavesdropping, but what if private entities or government offi-
cials manipulate domestic communications so that they pass 
briefly through foreign territory for the purpose of interception? 
In these ways, technology not only adds uncertainty to the mean-
ing of “territory” but also may result in unpredictable (though 
perhaps intentional) changes to seemingly settled expectations. 
A final but important functionalist argument for territoriali-
ty is the separation of powers.22 There is no shortage of judicial 
decisions and scholarly articles suggesting that there are func-
tional reasons to assign different responsibilities in matters of 
 
 19 See, for example, Hertz Corp v Friend, 559 US 77, 94–95 (2010) (espousing the 
benefits of a clear jurisdictional rule for corporations in organizing their behavior and for 
plaintiffs suing those businesses). 
 20 In Morrison v National Australia Bank Ltd, 561 US 247 (2010), for example, the 
Court explained what constituted “territoriality” under the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934. Id at 261–65. The decision, though framed as intuitive, was surprising to many ob-
servers and upset decades of settled circuit precedent. See id at 274–86 (Stevens concur-
ring); Lea Brilmayer, The New Extraterritoriality: Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 
Legislative Supremacy, and the Presumption against Extraterritorial Application of Ameri-
can Law, 40 Sw L Rev 655, 667–68 (2011) (criticizing Morrison’s “judicial creativity”). 
 21 See Jennifer Daskal, The Un-territoriality of Data, 125 Yale L J 326, 366–68 
(2015) (collecting sources). 
 22 See Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Glob-
alism, 37 Va J Intl L 505, 550–61 (1997) (defending territoriality on separation of powers 
grounds). 
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foreign affairs.23 For example, some argue that courts should 
take a backseat to the political branches in foreign relations cas-
es24 or that the division of labor between the executive and Con-
gress might vary in foreign policy.25 Even if these views are ac-
cepted, that does not mean that territorial rules should govern. 
As noted above, territoriality does not delineate the “delicate” for-
eign affairs issues that courts might avoid.26 Nor does it track ex-
pertise or experience that might justify an alternative separation 
of powers framework for foreign relations.27 
Separation of powers arguments also raise a baseline ques-
tion: What is the proper balance among the branches? This is 
not the place to directly answer this question. What may be said, 
though, is that given some balance of power at time t, we should 
be dubious about new arrangements at time t + 1 that result from 
changing technology rather than from deliberate action among 
the branches. For the same reasons that territoriality does not 
provide certainty to regulated parties, it also does not create cer-
tain and stable divisions among the branches of government. For 
similar reasons, we should also be concerned when technology at 
time t + 1 allows private parties to undercut a branch’s capacity 
to carry out its role in the interbranch scheme set at time t. In a 
related context, Professor Orin Kerr has advocated for a response 
to technology that constitutes an “equilibrium-adjustment.”28 
Kerr has argued that technology alone should not expand or 
 
 23 See, for example, United States v Curtiss-Wright Export Corp, 299 US 304, 319–22 
(1936) (discussing the greater executive discretion with statutes regarding foreign affairs); 
Harlan Grant Cohen, Formalism and Distrust: Foreign Affairs Law in the Roberts Court, 
83 Geo Wash L Rev 380, 386–87 (2015); Daniel Abebe and Aziz Z. Huq, Foreign Affairs 
Federalism: A Revisionist Approach, 66 Vand L Rev 723, 727–31 (2013); Derek Jinks and 
Neal Kumar Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 Yale L J 1230, 1236–38, 
1248–49 (2007); Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations 
Law, 116 Yale L J 1170, 1202 (2007). 
 24 See, for example, Posner and Sunstein, 116 Yale L J at 1204–07 (cited in 
note 23). 
 25 See, for example, Curtiss-Wright, 299 US at 319–22 (discussing the president’s 
unique role in foreign affairs). 
 26 See United States v Palmer, 16 US (3 Wheat) 610, 634–35 (1818). 
 27 See, for example, Jinks and Katyal, 116 Yale L J at 1245–49 (cited in note 23) 
(questioning whether the executive has the proper expertise and accountability to be due 
greater deference in foreign affairs). 
 28 Kerr, 67 Stan L Rev at 321 (cited in note 1); Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-
Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 Harv L Rev 476, 481 (2011). Professor 
Lawrence Lessig’s notion of constitutional “translation” provides another relevant analo-
gy. Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v Lopez, 1995 S Ct Rev 125, 
214. There are surely countless other potential analogies. 
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restrict government power under the Fourth Amendment.29 
Here, I suggest that technology alone should not alter the sepa-
ration of those governmental powers. And because technological 
changes have transformed the extraterritorial capacities of the 
branches, territorial rules should be updated to maintain the 
separation of powers (at least until those questions are directly 
confronted). 
II.  TERRITORIALITY AND THE SCA 
On December 4, 2013, a magistrate judge in the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York is-
sued a warrant under the SCA authorizing the DOJ to search 
and seize information from Microsoft that was associated with 
specific e-mail accounts.30 Under the SCA, the government may 
seek disclosure of stored communications in three tiers.31 With 
respect to Microsoft, the Government invoked the highest tier—
the SCA warrant—under which it may obtain from the Internet 
service provider (ISP) any opened or unopened e-mails without 
notice to the user.32 The court may issue an SCA warrant “using 
the procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure” (FRCrP),33 which require probable cause.34 
In response to the Government’s request for an SCA warrant, 
Microsoft filed a motion to quash the warrant as applied to infor-
mation stored on Microsoft-owned servers in Ireland.35 Microsoft 
argued that, because federal courts cannot issue extraterritorial 
warrants under FRCrP 41,36 the SCA’s warrant provision should 
be interpreted to apply only to data stored within the territory of 
the United States.37 Microsoft also argued that the presumption 
 
 29 Kerr, 67 Stan L Rev at 289–90 (cited in note 1). 
 30 See In the Matter of a Warrant to Search a Certain E-mail Account Controlled 
and Maintained by Microsoft Corp, 15 F Supp 3d 466, 467–68 (SDNY 2014) (“Microsoft”). 
 31 See 18 USC § 2703(a)–(d). See also Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored 
Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 Geo Wash L Rev 1208, 
1218–20 (2004). 
 32 See 18 USC § 2703(b)(1)(A). 
 33 18 USC § 2703(a). 
 34 See FRCrP 41(d)(1). 
 35 Microsoft, 15 F Supp 3d at 468. See also Microsoft’s Objections to the Magis-
trate’s Order Denying Microsoft’s Motion to Vacate in Part a Search Warrant Seeking 
Customer Information Located outside the United States, In the Matter of a Warrant to 
Search a Certain E-mail Account Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft Corp, Case No 
13-2814, *1 (SDNY filed June 6, 2014). 
 36 See FRCrP 41(b) (limiting a magistrate judge’s authority in this context to the issu-
ance of warrants to “search for and seize a person or property located within the district”). 
 37 See Microsoft, 15 F Supp 3d at 470. 
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against extraterritoriality suggested a territorial limit for the 
SCA and that such a limit depended on the location of the server 
on which the data were stored.38 These arguments turned not on 
the location or citizenship of the user but rather on the location 
of the stored data.39 
This case demonstrates how technology undercuts the sup-
posed strengths of territorial rules.40 Data move quickly across 
international borders.41 Territory thus does not achieve certain-
ty: it is not clear whether territoriality is measured by the loca-
tion of the data, the sender, the recipient, the ISP, or the gov-
ernment. Nor is it clear when territoriality is measured: If data 
cross jurisdictions, do we look at the time of storage, the time of 
search, or some time in between? Even if the territorial rule’s 
application were clear, the rule would not be a useful proxy for 
individual rights or foreign interests—the location of the data 
may not say anything about individuals’ expectations, nor may 
it predict whether a foreign state will have a meaningful objec-
tion to US policy.42 Indeed, Microsoft’s decision to store these da-
ta on foreign servers depended on its desire for cost-effective 
storage and the users’ answers to e-mail registration questions.43 
In this way, a territorial approach also seems to invite strategic 
behavior, as regulatees may be able to choose their regulatory 
regime depending on how they answer Microsoft’s questions.44 
 
 38 See id at 475–77. 
 39 For its part, the Government’s position also had a territorial tinge, measuring the 
SCA against the location of the warrant recipient (that is, Microsoft). See id at 475–76. 
 40 The weak version of this claim is that there should be no presumption regarding 
territorial scope. A stronger version is that when interpreting a statute that lays out the 
executive or judicial authority in technology/national-security cases, courts might apply 
a presumption against a presumption against extraterritoriality—that is, courts should 
presume that a territorial connection is not the exclusive basis on which the statute 
could apply. Of course, evidence of legislative intent of extraterritorial application could 
overcome this presumption. 
 41 See Daskal, 125 Yale L J at 366–68 (cited in note 21). 
 42 A foreign state might balk at US data policy, but that objection may turn on the 
citizenship of the user or ISP or on the content of the communication, not only the loca-
tion of the server. See, for example, Alison Smale, Germany Limits Cooperation with 
U.S. over Data Gathering (NY Times, May 7, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/VGU5 
-F2W9 (noting that Germany cut back on aiding US intelligence efforts after popular 
outrage at reports of German intelligence services spying on German firms and individ-
uals for the NSA). Again, the international law of jurisdiction gives some indication of 
other relevant interests beyond territory. See note 14. 
 43 See Microsoft, 15 F Supp 3d at 467; Daskal, 125 Yale L J at 390 (cited in note 21) 
(arguing that Microsoft’s position leads to the bizarre result that law enforcement’s access 
to evidence will depend on a company’s decisions about cost-effective storage locations). 
 44 Daskal, 125 Yale L J at 390 (cited in note 21) (“Nefarious players could manipu-
late data location to their advantage.”). 
  
2016] Territoriality, Technology, and National Security 53 
 
To generalize this point, technology reduces the cost of (oppor-
tunistically) relocating digital information compared to its ana-
log counterpart. 
Despite these arguments, Professor Jennifer Daskal’s recent 
treatment of the Microsoft case argues for a territorial outcome. 
Though as a policy matter she would like to see reform of the 
SCA, for separation of powers reasons she suggests that the 
Second Circuit should interpret the SCA not to authorize the 
warrant.45 Even on separation of powers grounds, however, 
Microsoft’s artificial territorial rule raises concerns by allowing 
the new information technology environment to upend existing 
interbranch arrangements.46 Statutory interpretation is a search 
for legislative intent, and it is hard to imagine Congress expect-
ing that the scope of executive authority would turn on the for-
tuity of the location where data are stored—especially when the 
territorial rule could encourage mischief on the part of ill-
intentioned users. 
Indeed, in some ways, the SCA represents a model of sepa-
rated powers: the legislature authorizes the collection of certain 
data subject to certain procedural requirements, the executive 
decides which communications to pursue, and the courts evalu-
ate the propriety of those requests and entertain objections to 
them.47 This is not to suggest that the SCA should be extended 
indefinitely. Rather, it would not be unreasonable for a court in-
terpreting the statute to understand its scope with an eye to-
ward reconciling the effects of dynamic technology and the back-
ground separation of powers. 
Perhaps a better separation of powers argument for a nar-
row reading of the SCA would be that the executive is in a 
strong position to request legislative updating, so courts should 
read the SCA to elicit congressional preferences.48 Things might 
be different, therefore, if the statute authorized unconstrained 
executive action. But the SCA includes powers and limits; thus, 
 
 45 See id at 395–97 (noting the policy and diplomatic implications of the Microsoft 
case, and urging Congress and the executive to resolve the issue). 
 46 See, for example, Orin S. Kerr, The Next Generation Communications Privacy 
Act, 162 U Pa L Rev 373, 407–08 (2014). 
 47 See 18 USC §§ 2701–12. 
 48 This argument has the feel of the rule of lenity, under which courts require a 
clear statement for criminal law. See, for example, McBoyle v United States, 283 US 25, 
27 (1931). For an example of an application of the rule of lenity outside the criminal con-
text, see Orin S. Kerr, A Rule of Lenity for National Security Surveillance Law, 100 Va L 
Rev 1513, 1514 (2014). 
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extending its authority extraterritorially also extends its protec-
tions. Alternatively, courts might turn their focus toward elicit-
ing executive preferences ex ante. For example, the Chevron doc-
trine offers deference to executive interpretations, provided that 
the agency gives notice and provides some open and (hopefully) 
clarifying process.49 Doctrines such as this will not resolve every 
case—indeed, the DOJ did not issue such an interpretation of 
the SCA—but they suggest a way forward that provides incen-
tives for notice and public deliberation.50 Additionally, this ap-
proach has the benefit of applying a transsubstantive framework 
despite a temptation to adopt exceptional approaches for national-
security cases. 
III.  TERRITORIALITY AND SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITIES 
US surveillance law is a web of authorities delineated by 
surveillance purpose, agent, and location.51 These boundary lines 
have important consequences for the scope of government pow-
ers and for the separation of those powers. When the boundary 
is territorial, technological advances may blur those lines—often 
in ways that are hidden from the relevant parties. 
A useful illustration of territorial boundaries in surveillance 
law can be found in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
197852 (FISA) and Executive Order (EO) 12333.53 In 1978, Con-
gress passed FISA to govern electronic surveillance for the pur-
poses of foreign intelligence.54 Unlike a Title III55 law-enforcement 
 
 49 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc, 467 US 837, 
865 (1984). See also Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons in the Review of Admin-
istrative Policymaking, 118 Yale L J 64, 75–84 (2008) (discussing the tension between 
Chevron and normative canons of statutory interpretation). 
 50 For example, the DOJ proposed amendments to FRCrP 41 that would have had the 
practical effect of increasing the FBI’s extraterritorial surveillance authority. See, for ex-
ample, Ahmed Ghappour, Justice Department Proposal Would Massively Expand FBI Ex-
traterritorial Surveillance (Just Security, Sept 16, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/G67G 
-RYK3. This note is meant not to endorse or oppose this proposal but only to suggest that 
the FRCrP amendment process has some advantages over less public and less deliberate 
alternatives. See Stephen B. Burbank and Sean Farhang, Litigation Reform: An Institu-
tional Approach, 162 U Pa L Rev 1543, 1546 (2014) (discussing the rulemaking process and 
changes in the process over time). 
 51 This Part focuses on territorial boundaries, but boundaries in surveillance law 
exist along other dimensions as well. 
 52 Pub L No 95-511, 92 Stat 1783, codified as amended in various sections of Titles 
18 and 50. 
 53 See generally Executive Order 12333, 3 CFR 200. 
 54 See 50 USC § 1802. 
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warrant, which is issued by a district court, FISA surveillance 
may proceed based on a court order from the special Foreign In-
telligence Surveillance Court (FISC) or on a certification of the 
attorney general.56 FISA sets out various substantive and proce-
dural guidelines,57 establishes congressional reporting require-
ments,58 and requires that the executive give notice of evidence 
obtained or derived from FISA surveillance, thus providing addi-
tional opportunities for judicial scrutiny.59 Although some have 
criticized the FISA process as too permissive,60 it is notable that 
FISA is a legislative enactment that sets out various authorities 
for and limits on executive actions that are reviewable by courts. 
FISA is often described as the exclusive authorization of 
electronic surveillance for the purposes of foreign intelligence,61 
but it turns out that the term “electronic surveillance” does im-
portant work in that claim. “Electronic surveillance” is defined 
to include the acquisition of communications in the United 
States or as a result of the intentional targeting of a US per-
son.62 But these conditions do not describe all of the activities 
that one might think of as electronic surveillance. “[I]f an intel-
ligence agency can construct plausible presumptions that sur-
veillance does not ‘intentionally target’ a US person and when 
the surveillance is conducted abroad, the permissive legal re-
gime under EO 12333 applies.”63 Unlike FISA, EO 12333 allows 
 
 55 Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub L No 
90-351, 82 Stat 211, codified as amended in various sections of Titles 18 and 47. 
 56 Compare 18 USC § 2516(1) (requiring an application to “a Federal judge of com-
petent jurisdiction” in order to intercept electronic communications), with 50 USC 
§ 1802(a)(1) (allowing the president, through the attorney general, to “authorize electron-
ic surveillance without a court order”), and 50 USC § 1804 (describing applications for 
FISC orders). 
 57 See 50 USC §§ 1801–11. 
 58 See 50 USC §§ 1807–08. 
 59 See 50 USC § 1806. 
 60 See, for example, Owen Fiss, Even in a Time of Terror, 31 Yale L & Pol Rev 1, 16 
(2012) (noting that the use of FISA procedures in foreign intelligence gathering has un-
dermined the traditional probable cause requirements of Katz v United States, 389 US 
347 (1967), and United States v United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Michigan, 407 US 297 (1972)). 
 61 See 50 USC § 1812(a) (noting that, with limited exceptions, FISA “shall be the 
exclusive means by which electronic surveillance and the interception of domestic wire, 
oral, or electronic communications may be conducted”). 
 62 50 USC § 1801(f). 
 63 Axel Arnbak and Sharon Goldberg, Loopholes for Circumventing the Constitu-
tion: Unrestrained Bulk Surveillance on Americans by Collecting Network Traffic 
Abroad, 21 Mich Telecomm & Tech L Rev 317, 321 (2015). See also The National Securi-
ty Agency: Missions, Authorities, Oversight and Partnerships *2–3 (NSA, Aug 9, 2013), 
archived at http://perma.cc/UGS5-2KFQ. 
  
56  The University of Chicago Law Review [83:45 
   
some surveillance with approval from only the attorney general 
or the NSA director.64 Procedural protections, including protec-
tions for US citizens, seem to be weaker under EO 12333 than 
FISA.65 EO 12333 is harder to challenge in court (and perhaps in 
the press) because it lacks FISA’s notice requirement.66 No stat-
ute requires congressional reporting of EO 12333 activity.67 And 
because it is an executive order, Congress is not a necessary par-
ty to EO 12333 updates.68 
Across a range of surveillance authorities including FISA 
and EO 12333, protections and oversight are greater within the 
United States than abroad.69 This may sound unremarkable, and 
this may indeed be a reasonable way to balance liberty and se-
curity. What is notable, however, is the way that advances in 
technology have changed the balance of power within this re-
gime. Researcher Axel Arnbak and Professor Sharon Goldberg, 
among others, have explained how seemingly domestic Internet 
traffic may be captured abroad, and is thus subject to EO 12333, 
when lawmakers may have presumed that it would be subject to 
FISA.70 The revealed MUSCULAR program, for example, in-
voked EO 12333 authority to intercept Google and Yahoo traffic 
from outside the United States.71 Perhaps deserving of greater 
attention, Arnbak and Goldberg have also demonstrated the 
technological tools available to intentionally divert US Internet 
 
 64 3 CFR 211–13. 
 65 See 3 CFR 215–16. See also John Napier Tye, Meet Executive Order 12333: The 
Reagan Rule That Lets the NSA Spy on Americans (Wash Post, July 18, 2014), archived 
at http://perma.cc/N4PU-AXFS (noting the low protections for the privacy of US citizens’ 
communications under EO 12333). 
 66 See Patrick C. Toomey, Executive Order 12333, Notice, and the Due Process Rights of 
Criminal Defendants (Just Security, Aug 14, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/F9K5-EYRP. 
 67 See, for example, Ali Watkins, Most of NSA’s Data Collection Authorized by Order 
Ronald Reagan Issued (McClatchyDC, Nov 21, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/8G57 
-N5BR (quoting then–Chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee Dianne Feinstein as ar-
guing that Congress does not sufficiently oversee EO 12333 programs). 
 68 Indeed, some have claimed that the executive has inherent authority to conduct 
certain surveillance operations. See, for example, John Yoo, The Terrorist Surveillance 
Program and the Constitution, 14 Geo Mason L Rev 565, 589 (2007). 
 69 See Daskal, 125 Yale L J at 353 (cited in note 21) (arguing that “the entire statu-
tory scheme governing foreign intelligence surveillance is premised on an assumption 
that persons located in the United States are entitled to greater privacy protections than 
those outside U.S. borders”). 
 70 Arnbak and Goldberg, 21 Mich Telecomm & Tech L Rev at 343 (cited in note 63) 
(explaining that “traffic between two US endpoints that is naturally routed abroad can 
[ ] be collected abroad under the permissive EO 12333 regime”). 
 71 See Barton Gellman and Ashkan Soltani, NSA Infiltrates Links to Yahoo, Google 
Data Centers Worldwide, Snowden Documents Say (Wash Post, Oct 30, 2013), archived 
at http://perma.cc/L4PT-KD7W. 
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traffic abroad.72 There are reasons to think that the US govern-
ment has the capacity to divert traffic outside the United States 
by using “impersonated” Border Gateway Protocol messages,73 
by subverting the domain name system mapping for a domain,74 
or by employing other network exploits.75 And the government 
may argue that these newly extraterritorial data are subject to 
EO 12333 rather than FISA.76 
In the terms of this Essay, these techniques highlight the 
weaknesses of the case for territorial rules. If the executive were 
to employ these tools, users and providers of information tech-
nology would be unaware of the territorial locations of their da-
ta, and the interests of policymakers at home and abroad would 
further diverge from territorial location. Technology also alters 
the interbranch dynamic in these cases: executive officials can 
conduct more surveillance without judicial scrutiny, congres-
sional participation, or even internal checks at the highest lev-
els. The lack of direct oversight has knock-on effects, because it 
may be more difficult for the other branches to rebalance the 
scales contemporaneously or in hindsight—if Congress, the 
courts, and the public are unaware of much of the EO 12333 
surveillance, then how can they rein in the excesses that may 
result from myopically territorial rules? 
Each branch has opportunities to scrutinize surveillance re-
gimes. For example, Congress must reauthorize many relevant 
 
 72 Arnbak and Goldberg, 21 Mich Telecomm & Tech L Rev at 347–56 (cited in note 
63). Technology, of course, is not a necessary ingredient to the executive’s intentional ma-
nipulation of territorial rules. In the context of national-security policy, the recently re-
leased “torture report” confirmed that the executive branch strategically moved detainees 
to avoid judicial review predicated on territorial connections. See Report of the Senate Se-
lect Committee on Intelligence: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Deten-
tion and Interrogation Program Together with Foreword by Chairman Feinstein and Addi-
tional and Minority Views, S Rep No 113-288, 113th Cong, 2d Sess 140–41 (2014). See also 
Steve Vladeck, The SSCI Torture Report, Rasul, and Transfers to Avoid Jurisdiction (Just 
Security, Dec 9, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/HK9U-2DNX. 
 73 Arnbak and Goldberg, 21 Mich Telecomm & Tech L Rev at 347–51 (cited in note 
63). See also Andrea Peterson, Researchers Say U.S. Internet Traffic Was Re-routed 
through Belarus. That’s a Problem. (Wash Post, Nov 20, 2013), archived at 
http://perma.cc/8PDU-VWNA (noting a recent rerouting of Internet traffic and explain-
ing that rerouting presents the “opportunity for bad actors to snoop on traffic”). 
 74 This technique may be employed extraterritorially. See Arnbak and Goldberg, 21 
Mich Telecomm & Tech L Rev at 351–52 (cited in note 63). 
 75 See id at 355–56. See also Darlene Storm, 17 Exploits the NSA Uses to Hack PCs, 
Routers and Servers for Surveillance (Computerworld, Jan 3, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/9JCB-FNFS. 
 76 See Arnbak and Goldberg, 21 Mich Telecomm & Tech L Rev at 323 (cited in note 
63) (drawing an analogy to the legal case for the MUSCULAR program). 
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provisions,77 the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board has 
declared its intention to review EO 12333,78 and judicial super-
vision of government surveillance is also possible.79 And, for the 
reasons given here, this scrutiny should extend to the territorial 
rules that mark the boundaries of those regimes. 
IV.  TERRITORIALITY AND COURT ACCESS 
An attentive reader might think that the Constitution has 
something to say about the overreach just described. In deci-
sions such as Reid v Covert80 and Boumediene v Bush,81 the Su-
preme Court has acknowledged that some constitutional rights 
apply extraterritorially in certain circumstances.82 So, if the gov-
ernment has the authority to act extraterritorially—an authori-
ty more easily exercised with modern technology—and if a gov-
ernmental act potentially violates substantive rights that are 
extraterritorial in scope, then one might think that individuals 
should be able to vindicate those rights regardless of their loca-
tions. And yet, courts have layered additional, territorial limits 
on existing rules for court access to make those claims in crimi-
nal and civil cases. 
One area in which territory may curtail court access is crimi-
nal procedure. In United States v Hijazi,83 a Lebanese citizen liv-
ing in Kuwait was indicted for fraud arising out of dealings with 
the US military in the Middle East.84 Apart from a brief visit 
 
 77 See PATRIOT Sunsets Extension Act of 2011, Pub L No 112-14, 125 Stat 216, 
codified as amended at 50 USC §§ 1801, 1805, 1861–62. 
 78 See PCLOB Announces Its Short-Term Agenda (Privacy and Civil Liberties Over-
sight Board, Sept 3, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/AWH9-TZ7S. 
 79 See, for example, American Civil Liberties Union v Clapper, 785 F3d 787, 810 (2d 
Cir 2015) (holding that the appellants were not precluded from suing the Government for 
surveillance programs carried out under the aegis of FISA). 
 80 354 US 1 (1957). 
 81 553 US 723 (2008). 
 82 See, for example, id at 732 (holding that aliens detained at Guantánamo “do have 
the habeas corpus privilege”); United States v Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 US 259, 277–78 
(1990) (Kennedy concurring) (arguing that, while the Fourth Amendment was not violat-
ed in this case, the Constitution may apply extraterritorially when the result would not 
be “impracticable and anomalous”); Covert, 354 US at 74–75 (Harlan concurring) (argu-
ing that the Constitution should apply extraterritorially when not “impracticable and 
anomalous”). 
 83 2008 WL 4151337 (CD Ill). 
 84 See In re Hijazi, 589 F3d 401, 404–05 (7th Cir 2009) (discussing the lower court’s 
proceedings). Hijazi’s constitutional claims relied on the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment and the speedy trial right of the Sixth Amendment (because his indictment 
sat for five years without further process). See id at 403. 
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years prior, which all parties agreed was unrelated to the case, 
Hijazi had never been to the United States, nor had he planned to 
come.85 Hijazi filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that his extrater-
ritorial prosecution violated his rights under the Constitution and 
exceeded the terms of the relevant statute.86 The Government 
argued that unless and until Hijazi came to the United States in 
person, he should not be permitted to have a hearing on his 
claims.87 
Drawing an analogy to the fugitive-disentitlement doctrine, 
the district court refused to address the motion to dismiss, not-
ing that Hijazi sought “the benefit of a ruling from [the court] 
without the risk that, if the ruling [was] not in his favor, he ap-
pear and be arraigned.”88 Note that the court did not rule that 
the Constitution was territorial in scope but instead refused to 
entertain the motion because the defendant himself was outside 
US territory. The Seventh Circuit overruled this decision and 
ordered the district court to rule on the motion,89 but in a recent 
prosecution arising from the alleged manipulation of LIBOR, the 
DOJ again argued that the court should reject an extraterritori-
al defendant’s motion to dismiss an indictment: “The Court 
should not devote its resources to resolving claims asserted by a 
defendant who will not submit to its authority.”90 
It is true that an extraterritorial defendant is differently 
situated from a territorial one—if the motion to dismiss is de-
nied, the extraterritorial defendant remains free. But extraterri-
torial indictees are still burdened,91 and in any event, judicial 
abstention in these situations has the effect of accreting power 
 
 85 Id at 412. The Government alleged various connections to the United States, none 
of which involved territorial presence. Of note, the Government suggested that Hijazi’s 
fraud was connected to the United States because “Hijazi (located in Kuwait) sent 
[emails] to Mazon (located in Greece) using email addresses that the government charac-
terize[d] as ‘based in the United States’ (e.g., Jeff.Mazon@Halliburton.com).” Id at 411. 
 86 Id at 405. 
 87 See Government’s Motion to Stay Ruling on Defendant Hijazi’s Second Motion to 
Dismiss the Indictment and to Hold Motion in Abeyance pending Arraignment, United 
States v Hijazi, Criminal Action No 05-40024, *2 (CD Ill filed Jan 24, 2008) (available on 
Westlaw at 2008 WL 8838781). 
 88 Hijazi, 2008 WL 4151337 at *2. 
 89 In re Hijazi, 589 F3d at 414. 
 90 Opposition to Defendant Roger Darin’s Motion to Dismiss the Criminal Com-
plaint, United States v Hayes, Case No 12-3229, *39 (SDNY filed Nov 18, 2014). The 
magistrate judge rejected the Government’s argument and heard the motion but denied 
it on the merits. United States v Hayes, 99 F Supp 3d 409, 426 (SDNY 2015). 
 91 See, for example, In re Hijazi, 589 F3d at 407 (“As long as the indictment hangs 
over Hijazi, he is prejudiced even if he does not travel to the United States.”). 
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to the executive. In the words of the Supreme Court, “the claims 
of individuals—not of Government departments—have been the 
principal source of judicial decisions concerning separation of 
powers and checks and balances.”92 But by conditioning individ-
uals’ court access on territorial presence, courts may ignore 
meaningful individual claims. This result is particularly appar-
ent when information technology facilitates the extension of the 
government’s investigative and prosecutorial authority. For ex-
ample, imagine that the US government offers an indictment 
based solely on evidence gathered pursuant to the type of extra-
territorial surveillance described in Part III. In cases like this 
one, maintaining a territorial rule in light of the executive’s in-
creased capacity produces a new (different) separation of powers 
outside the United States, even with respect to those constitu-
tional provisions that purportedly apply extraterritorially.93 
A similar story can be told with respect to the government’s 
territorialist objections to civil litigation that seeks monetary re-
lief. Although courts have shown some willingness to extend 
some constitutional rights and associated equitable remedies to 
extraterritorial cases, claims brought pursuant to Bivens v Six 
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics94 have 
been a different story. At least five courts of appeals have dis-
missed Bivens claims because special factors counsel against ex-
traterritorial Bivens actions related to national security,95 even in 
suits filed by US citizens.96 Professor Andrew Kent, among others, 
has defended this territorialist practice on separation of powers 
grounds.97 Meanwhile, in the takings context, courts have dis-
missed extraterritorial takings actions on the basis of prudential 
standing—again, without reference to the territorial scope of the 
 
 92 Bond v United States, 131 S Ct 2355, 2365 (2011). 
 93 An equilibrium adjustment might provide that if something other than territorial 
presence brings someone within the scope of a statute—for example, Internet contacts—
then, at a minimum, that connection alone should be sufficient to challenge the statute’s 
constitutionality in court. One might be able to make a similar proposal to expand the sub-
stantial voluntary connections required for constitutional rights to attach under Verdugo-
Urquidez, though that issue is beyond the scope of this Essay. 
 94 403 US 388 (1971). 
 95 See Andrew Kent, Are Damages Different?: Bivens and National Security, 87 
S Cal L Rev 1123, 1125–26 (2014) (collecting cases). In the words of one judge: “[T]here is 
a fundamental difference between courts evaluating the legitimacy of actions taken by 
federal officials in the domestic arena and evaluating the same conduct when taken in 
the international realm.” Arar v Ashcroft, 414 F Supp 2d 250, 282 (EDNY 2006). 
 96 See, for example, Vance v Rumsfeld, 701 F3d 193, 195, 203 (7th Cir 2012) (en 
banc); Lebron v Rumsfeld, 670 F3d 540, 556 (4th Cir 2012). 
 97 Kent, 87 S Cal L Rev at 1192–93 (cited in note 95). 
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substantive right.98 In Atamirzayeva v United States,99 the plain-
tiff alleged that American authorities conspired to demolish her 
cafeteria near the US embassy in Uzbekistan and replace it with 
a security checkpoint.100 The Court of Federal Claims dismissed 
the case because the extraterritorial plaintiff lacked prudential 
standing, while it explicitly acknowledged that, on the merits, 
“the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment has extraterritori-
al application.”101 
Bivens suits and takings claims compensate individuals for 
constitutional deprivations but also have consequences for exec-
utive decisionmaking. “[T]he purpose of Bivens is to deter the of-
ficer.”102 “[T]he Takings Clause is meant to curb inefficient tak-
ings.”103 These goals are frustrated when courts cut off 
meritorious suits on territorial theories. And, for reasons articu-
lated above, there is not a solid justification for applying a terri-
torially based rule—particularly when technology lowers the 
barriers to extraterritorial government conduct, which might vi-
olate the Constitution.104 Instead, if courts endeavor to prevent 
technology from tipping the interbranch balance of power, court-
access doctrines need to adjust to the modern national-security 
environment. 
Nothing here should be read to say that every constitutional 
provision should apply in every extraterritorial case. Debates 
about the extraterritorial reach of the Constitution are ongoing.105 
 
 98 See Jeffrey Kahn, Zoya’s Standing Problem, or, When Should the Constitution 
Follow the Flag?, 108 Mich L Rev 673, 674–76, 685 (2010) (collecting cases). 
 99 77 Fed Cl 378 (2007). 
 100 Id at 379. 
 101 Id at 385, 387. Courts have taken similar steps in other court-access cases as 
well. See Kahn, 108 Mich L Rev at 685 (cited in note 98). 
 102 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v Meyer, 510 US 471, 485 (1994) (empha-
sis omitted). 
 103 District Intown Properties LP v District of Columbia, 198 F3d 874, 887 (DC 
Cir 1999). 
 104 Imagine, for example, an extraterritorial plaintiff (US citizen or not) claiming 
that the US government violated her right to due process or took her property without 
just compensation by using a computer virus or other network attack. See, for example, 
Kevin Poulsen, Visit the Wrong Website, and the FBI Could End Up in Your Computer 
(Wired, Aug 5, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/LTC2-CCT2 (discussing the use of net-
work investigative techniques, sometimes extraterritorially, with the goal of “giv[ing] the 
government access to your files, location, web history[,] and webcam for a month at a 
time”). See also David E. Sanger, Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks against 
Iran (NY Times, June 1, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/U36M-A5K9 (discussing the 
Stuxnet offensive cyberattack). 
 105 See generally, for example, Kal Raustiala, Does the Constitution Follow the Flag? 
The Evolution of Territoriality in American Law (Oxford 2009). 
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But the judiciary should not sit out those debates because of ter-
ritorial court-access doctrines. And if those rights are extended 
extraterritorially, the judiciary should not abstain from giving 
them effect on territorialist grounds alone. 
CONCLUSION 
Modern technology butts up against the separation of pow-
ers along many dimensions discussed in this Symposium. Here, 
I have taken up one such dimension: the way that technology 
makes already-weak territorial rules appear even weaker. 
Whether they are used to interpret statutes, define executive 
power, or allocate court access, these territorial rules do not live 
up to their status as presumptive defaults. In some cases, the 
benefits of rules (as opposed to standards) will be significant, 
but that does not mean that territory has to be the lodestar of 
the chosen rule. In other cases, modern technology may have di-
luted the benefits of rules such that standards are more appro-
priate. The point here is not to determine the best solution for 
every case but merely to suggest that territorial rules seem to be 
an increasingly poor match for the modern environment. 
Looking ahead, just as separation of powers concerns motivate 
much of the criticism of territorial rules in these cases, they also 
suggest potential responses. For one thing, technology/national-
security cases pose hard questions for any one branch, so ar-
rangements that encourage interbranch coordination should be 
valued. The interlocking participation in stored-communications 
access, like Professor Aziz Huq’s original vision of the Fourth 
Amendment,106 is not to be trivialized. Similarly, doctrines that 
respect congressional delegations and executive, ex ante decision-
making, subject to judicial review, should be encouraged.107 On 
the other hand, approaches like the territorial court-access doc-
trines that have the effect of knocking out one or more branches’ 
participation should be viewed with a gimlet eye. This is espe-
cially true, of course, when the normative justifications for such 
rules are so weak. Finally, although I am generally skeptical of 
foreign affairs or national-security exceptionalism, there may be 
a stronger case for technology exceptionalism. In the 
rules/standards frame, it may be that new technologies demand 
 
 106 See generally Aziz Z. Huq, How the Fourth Amendment and the Separation of 
Powers Rise (and Fall) Together, 83 U Chi L Rev 139 (2016).  
 107 See notes 24, 49, and accompanying text (discussing Chevron U.S.A. Inc v Natu-
ral Resources Defense Council, Inc, 467 US 837 (1984)). 
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standards that coalesce into rules only with time. Or in the sepa-
ration of powers frame, it may be that functionalist arguments for 
particular branch roles have force when dealing with new tech-
nologies until formal divisions can be laid out with clarity. Either 
way, the path forward relies on institutional responses to improve 
on the rigid territorial rules that tempt parties and courts. 
 
